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!NTERSTATE COMMERCE DURING THE SILENCE

BY CONGRESS
By
Clarence G. Shenton LL. M.
4. REASONABLENESS
The three tests of state regulation previously discussed have had nothing to do with the intn'nsic reasonableness of the statutes to which they are applied. In
each case the possibility of certain interstate complications ihas been the cause for annullment. The statutes
have been considered, not in isolation, with regard to
their own inherent reasonableness, but in their relation
to possible statutes of other states, and interstate relations generally. The statute in Minnesota v. Barber, requiring inspection of rWeats, may -in itself have been a
reasonable regulation, as applied to dealers in meat in
Minnesota, but it was annulled because it produced inequality between Minnesota dealers and those in adjoinThe tolls prescribed by Kentucky in the
ing states.
Covington Bridge Case may have yielded a fair return to the Bridge Company, but the statute was annulled because of the possibility that tolls in the State of
Ohio could be subject to two conflicting laws if the
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statute of Kentucky were perni'tted to be effective in
Ohio. So, in Hall v. DeCuir the reasonableness of the
regulation in itself was not inquired into. The alleged
vice of the statute was that it controlled a subject which
movedl from state to state. In all these cases it is conceivable that, if Congress had been the regulating power, the regulations could have been held reasonable under
the fifth amendment. The inherent fault was not in
their unreasonableness, but in the fact that they were
enacted by states.
Whie it is possible that state regulations affecting interstate commerce will be nullified because of apprehended interstate complications, without regard to
their inherent reasonableness, it could not be expected that legislation unreasonable in itself would be sustained. Regulations designed to ensure the safety of
travellers and employees in interstate commerce, and
prescribing generally the rights and duties of those who
engage in such commerce, have successfully stood the
test of the commerce clause. Full crew laws,1 laws regulating the speed of trains,2 heating of cars' and others
too numerous to mention have been sustained. They
would not be sustained if it were thought that they
denied due process or equal protection of the law to the
persons, utilities, and agencies regulated. The point is
neatly illustrated by the upholding of a statute relative
to the heating of cars in N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v.
New York, and the annullment of that part of Covington's ordinance which required that cars be heated to 50
degrees Fahrenheit. The ground of annullment in the
latter case was, as bus been said, that the undisputed
1.
2.
8.
4.

C. R. I. and P. R. R. Co. vs. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453.
Southern Bafway Oom!pany vs. King, 217 U. S. 524.
N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628.
South Codington RaihMy Co. v. Oovingbtn, 235 U. S. 537.
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testimony showed that it was impossible to heat cars
uniformly at the required temperature.
In Southern Railway Company v. King, 217 U. S.,
at page 533, it was said: "It is consistent with former
decisions of this court and with a proper interpretation of constitutional rights, at least in the absence of
Congressional action upon the same subject matter, for
the state to regulate the manner in which interstate
trains shall approach dangerous crossings, the signals
which shall be given, and the control of the train which
shall be required under such circumstances. CrossingV
may be so situated in reference to cuts and curves as to
render them highly dangierous to those using public
bighways. They may be in or near towns or cities, so
that to approach them at a -high rate of speed would be
attended with great danger to life or limb. On the other
hand, 'highway crossings may be so numerous and so
near together that to require interstate trains to slacken
speed indiscriminately at all such crossings would be
practically destructive of the successful operaV on of
passenger trains." The decision sustained the valid ty of
a statute requiring that trains be slowed down so as to
be able to stop in case of danger to users of any public
road at a grade crossing.
The same statute may under one set of facts be
held valid, and under another set, be held invalid. In
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Blackwel, 244 U. S. 310,
the statute discussed in the preceding paragraph was
before the Supreme Court. It appeared however, that
in the particular case in which it was sought to sustain
a conviction under the statute, compliance with the
terms of the statute would have added six hours to an
interstate journey scheduled to be made in four. In
th's case the law was said to be a "direct" interference
with interstate commerce, and it was held that the
penalty prescribed for violation could not be imposed.

110

Dikidnson Law Review

Southern Railway Co. v. King, supra, illustrates the
fact that although stAte regulation of interstate commerce is not permitted to be unreasonable, the right of
interstate commerce to be free from restraint is not absolute, and state restraint is legitimate if not unreasonable. The principle 'is further illustrated by Escanaba
Co. v. Ohicago, 107 U. S. 678. The Escanaba Company's
ships, engaged in interstate commerce, made use of
the Chicago River. An ordinance of the City of Chicago
provided that during certain rush hours draw bridges
across the Chicago River Were to be kept closed, anc
that at other times in the day the bridges were not to
be kept open more than ten minutes at a time. The
bridges,
it seems, carried
great
numbers
of
persons
and vehicles.
If any regulation Wvhich
hinders
or
obstructs
interstate
commerce
is
void,
then
the ordinance
of the
City of
Chicago should have been so held, since, if only for
periods of an hour and a half at rush hours, and ten
minutes at other times, commerce among the sthtes was
delayed and hampered. But the facilitation of interstate commerce does not seem to have been the sole
object to be attained. The reasonableness of the impediment was considered. It seems to have been thought
that it was reasonable to require ships to wait for the
periods prescribed in view of the enormous inconvenzence which would result if traffic on the bridge should
be held up to suit the convenience of the ship operators.
The opposite decision was reached ,n the case of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Company, 13 How. 518. In
that case the bridge conferred so few benefits in comparison to the obstruction caused by it, that it was
called a "nuisance."
A decision as to the reasonableness of a state law affecting interstate connerce is a decision as to the legitimacy of the commerce or ways of conducting it which
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the state law restricts or prohibits. The question of the
legitimacy of commerce frequently arises in connection
with the efforts on the part of a state to protect its citizens from articles deemed deleterious to their welfare
and morals. If the Supreme Court is convinced that
the articles excluded are harmful the state law will
be called valid. Thus, in Plur-ley v. Massachusetts,
155 U. S. 461, a statute was held valid which prohibited
the sale of oleomargarine so colored and made up as to
masquerade with success as butter. It see=s to have
'been thought that there was no inherent right to engage in such commerce. Things legitimate in themselves may become illegitimate through the'r capacity
to spread disease and dao other harm. It is accordingly
held that state quarantine and inspection laws are valid
in so far as they do not exceed the necessities of the case,
and do not prevent the introduction into the state of
sound articles from other states.!
The question of the reasonableness of a statute restricting importation into a state necesshrily involves
a decision as to the legitimacy of the thing Wihose importation is restricted. As would be expected from. the fact
that the Supreme Court is the court of final appeal in
such cases, it is that court's judgment on the point of
leg'timacy or illegitimacy which prevails in case of diversity of opinion. In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania,
171 U. S. 1, there was under consideration an act of
the legislature of Pennsylvania making it a misdemeanor to manufacture or sell oleomargarine. An importer of
oleomargarine had been convicted under the act and the
conviction had been sustained by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. The organs constituted by the people
5. Smith v. Ry. OD. 181, U. S. 248; Kimmish v. Ball, 129, U.
S. 217; Hannibal ird ;t. Joe .R. Co., v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465;
IVinnesota v. Barber. 136 U. S. 313.
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of Pennsylvania for expressing the <oinion of that
state had pronounced oleomargarine an illegitimate article of commerce. The Supreme Court, consuiiVng the
general opinion of the commercial world and the
country at large on the subject, and taking account of
the fact that Congress by taxing oleomiargarine had regarded it an article of commerce, came to the conclusion that oleomargarine was a legitimate article of commerce, and that the Pennsylvania statute was invad
to the extent that it prohibited the introduction of
oleomargarine from other states and its sale in the original package.
It must be taken as the basis of the decision in
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvana that the denial of the
right to traffic in a legitimate article of commerce was
not reasonable. The fact that the oleomargarine for
the sale of which Schollenberger 'had been convicted
came from another state cannot be considered as the
controlling factor of the case. It is not conceivable that
the state's right would have been denied if the Supreme
Court bad been conv.nced that oleomargardne is not
a proper subject of commerce, that it is harniful and
dangerous, or if some admittedly harmful article had
been the subject of the controversy instead of oleomargarine.
It is worth while noting, however, that, although
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania was based upon the unreasonableness of the restriction, the test was not that
of the fourteenth amendment. It seems that regulations which are reasonable -as applied to internal commerce may be unreasonable in their xelation to 'iterstate
commerce. That this is the case appears from the following in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania. "It is claimed, however, that the very -statute under consideration
has -heretofore been held valid by this court in the case
of Powell v. Pennsylvanaa, 127 U. S. 678. This case did
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not dnvolve rights arising under the commerce clause
of the Federal Constitution. The article was manufactured and sold within the state and the question was cne
as to the police power of the state, acting upon a subject always within its jurisdiction."
It would appear that, if the Supreme Court was
conv'nced that oleomargarine was a legitimate and
proper subject of commerce, it should have held in
Powell v. Pennsylvania that to deny the right to mandfacture and sell oleomargarine even within the State of
Pennsylvania was a denial of due process and equal
protection. In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania deference
seems to have been paid to the opinion of the country
and the commercial world ,n general; in Powell v. Pennsylvania all the deference was paid to the legislature
which 'had passed, and the state judiciary which had
passed upon, the statute. The difference might perhaps
also be accounted for by the fact that the Supreme
Court thought itself bound to be guided by the opinion
of Congress as to the legiVmacy of oleomargarine in
cases involving interstate commerce, whereas it acknowledged no such standard in the case of a regulation of
pure.y internal traffic. It seems more reasonable to believe, however, that the opinion of Congress did not
control the decision as to legitimacy, but that it was
used to support a conviction actually -held by the court.
Probably the wisdom of the court in reaching the two
conclusions is not to be severely criticised. It is no
doubt expedient to permit local self government wherever -t is consistent with the interests of the nation at
large, although it must be said that the fourteenth
amendment was not passed, and certainly is not used
for the purpose of furthering the validity of state legislation. From this and other examples, however, it is
seen to be unsafe to say that the test of due process
and equal protection of the law is applied to state regu-
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lations affecting interstate commerce. Probably all that
can be safely said is that regulaVons which would be declared invalid -under the test of the fourteenth amendment could not possibly be sustained under the comnmerce clause, for the contrary does not seem to be true.
If the people of forty-seven states are of the opinion that a certain article is a legitimate subject of commerce, they cannot but feel aggrieved if, because of probibitory laws, they are unable to market such goods in
the forty-eighth state. There is no way to settle the difficulty which arises except by a judgment as to the legitimacy of the traffic, by a commpn tribunal, 'which must
necessarily be a federal court. It would be expected
tlat a judgment by that tribunal to the effect that the
traffic is legitimate would make ,it possible to market
the commodity in the forty-eigh-th state without restraint. But, a'.though the Supreme Court declares that
to permit a state to restrict interstate trade in that
which is legitimate is to permit commerce to be burdened, and that interstate commerce must not be burdened
by states, the freedom from burden granted by the Supreme Court is nevertheless to some extent ,illusory, as
will appear in the subsequent discussion of the "Original
Package Rule."
5. SUBJECTS LOCAL AND NATIONAL
Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, was the first case to attempt
a generalization on the subject of the relative power of
state and federal governments over interstate commerce
while Congress is silent. There was in issue the right
of the Board of Wardens to enforce pilot regulations in
the Port of Philadelphia.
It was conceded that the Board of Wardens was
attempting a regulation of interstate comnerce. It was
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said that "the power to regulate comrrnerce embraces a
vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly
various subjects, some rmperatively demanding a single
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the
United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that
diversity vhich alone can meet the local necessities of
nawgation." It was said that the subject of pilot laws
is "local and not national; that it is likely to be best
provided for, not by one system or plan of regulation,
but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several states may deem applicable to the local peculiarities
of the ports wi'th-in their limits." The much quoted and
paraphrased doctrine is then promulgated to the effect
that "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system or
plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
Although the case was one in whch state regulation
was considered permissible, the doctrine is couched in
terms of the subjects wihich it would be desirable that
Congress should control. From the enrphasis placed by
the Supreme Court upon powers which were considered
to belong to Congress, it would seem that in the minds
of the judges the Cooley Case presented a question as to
the desirAbility and legality of state regulation, as compared with federal regulaVon. But as Congress had not
legislated upon the subject, and, if it had, its legislation
would ipso facto have annulled the regulations of the
Board, of Wardens, the facts clearly formed an issue as
to the legality and desirability of state regulation as
compared we-th no regulation at all. The Supreme Court
was not called upon to lay down precepts for the guidance of Congress, but it was called upon to define the
power of the states while Congress had taken no
action. The intent of the Court, as applied to the real
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issue, may therefore be fairly summarized as denying to
the states the power to regulate subjects of interstate
commerce national in their nature and conceding to them
during the silence of Congress the power to regulate
subjects local in their nature.
What is the difference between a subject of interstate commerce local in its nature, and one national in
its nature? The Supreme Court has never g.ven a satisfactory answer to that question, and in consequence
the rule of the Cooley Case is largely useless for determining whether or not a given subject of interstate commerce can be regulated by a state. Certainly it cannot be
said that the results which have been reached in the
cases make it possible to formulate intelligible definitions of subjects local and national in their nature.
The subject of pilot laws was -held to be local in the
Cooley Case because it did not call for a "single uniform
rule, operating equally in every port" of the country. It
was not thought necessary or desirable that the same
rules should be applicable to plots in all the country's
harbors. It would similarly seem unnecessary for tolls
on every interstate bridge in the country to be prescribed by a single uniform law operating equally on all such
br.dges. But in Covington &c. Bridge Co. v. Ky., the
Supreme Court held that the State of Kentucky had no
power to regulate the tolls on an interstate bredge.
Under the doctrine of the Cooley Case must it be concluded that regulation of tolls on a bridge is a subject
national and not local in its nature? It has been held
that a state has power to regulate rates of ferriage on
an interstate ferry. It is not at all apparent why the
%ubject of toll regulation on an interstate bridge is national in its nature, while regulation of rates of ferriage
on an interstate ferry -is local in its nature.
6. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317.
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'it will probably be foumd that the Supreme Court
has consistently denied to the states power to regulate
subjects of interstate commerce vwhich are reasonably
defined as being national in their nature. It will not be
found, however, that the states are consistently permitted to regulate subjects which might be reasonably defined as local in their nature, that is, so far as any subject of interstate commierce can be of local nature. That
states may not impair the freedom of interstate commerce by imposing upon it burdensome restrictions,
and that states may not enact legislation affecting interstate commerce wIch discriminates in favox of their
own citizens as against citizens of other states, are commonplaces in the law of the commerce clause. The
subject of pilot laws was adjudged local in the Cooley
Case. It is not conceivable, however, that the validity
of the regulations of the Board of Wardens would have
been sustained had they in any way discrminated
against citizens of states other than Pennsylvania, or
had the regulations been unreasonable and burdensome.
It would seem quite evident that no matter how local in
its nature the subject regdlated may be, no conclusion
can be readhed as to the validity of the regulation,
unless there is also taken into consideration the effect
of the regulation. In short, the test for the validly
of state legislation laid down in the Cooley Case is not
complete.
Even if the question in the Cooley Case had concerned the relative merits of state regulation and regulation by Congress, the distinction between subjects which
are best regulated by diverse law, and those which require laws of uniform and equal application, was not
well taken. It would not be contended that Congress
could not attain such diversity, and that only by state
legislation could it be attained.
Uniformity can be
-attained by Congrems where it cannot be attained by
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state legislation, but that is not to say that legislation
by Congress must be uniform. The power of Congress
to regtflate interstate commnerce is quakfied only by the
limitations that it shall not tax articles exported by a
state, or give preferences to the ports of one state over
those of another. It is not required with respect to the
interstate commerce power, that laws passed in pursuance thereof must be uniform. Congress probably would
not attempt to establish uniform fr&ght rates, applicable on the Pacific Coast as well as on the Atlantic,
and in al other parts of the country. Through the medium of the Inteitate Commerce Commission, Congress
has arranged to furnish the diversity of regulation of
rates which is made necessary by the fact that rate
schedules cannot be scientifically constructed without
consideration of the myriad details of locality.
That
Congress could accomplish the same thing with regard
to the subject of pilot laws cannot be doubted. Therefore
although the Supreme Court mjay frequently find diversity attained by state regulation in cases where diversity is deemed necessary, and may choose to let stand
the status quo, the fact that the diversity is so attained
could not be a compelling reason for a decision that
the subject can be more satisfactorily regulated by the
state than by Congress. On the other hand, it cannot
be the compelling reason for annulling a state regulation, that the subject is such as demands uniform laws
of equal application, for the issue, as has been said, is
not between the merits of state regulation and congressional regulation, but between state regulation and
no regulation at all. Congressional legislation is not
necessarily forthcoming the moment state regulation is
annulled. When the Supreme Court annuls state legislation under the theory that the subject demands uniformity of regulation, the only uniformity it is in position
to furnish is a uniform lack of regulation. The approv-
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al of a regulation by a state gives no assurance whatever
that all. the other states will pass similar statutes, so
that the Supreme Court is powerless *to promote the
'ause of uniform positive legislation while Congress is
silent.
The thought of the Supreme Court in the Cooley
Case does not appear to have been very aptly expressed.
If any meaning is to be denrved from it, it is not that
state regulations are annulled where uniformity and
equal application of law are considered preferable to diversity, but rather where singleness of control cannot be
realized under state regulation. Whether or not diversity of regulation Ps essential, it is necssary that subjects of interstate commerce be not governed by conf'icting rules. Where the subject lies entirely within the
boundaries of a state, as may be the case, for example,
with harbors, the state can furnish the requisite singleness of control. Sngleness of control is not assured if
the state undertakes to make 'ts statutes operate
extraterritorially, as in the Covington Bridge Case. Nor
is it assured. where the agencies of interstate commrercc
at which legislation is directed move from state to state.
Where tl-s multiple control is possible, and is considered likely to cause embarrassment, the subject is likely to
be called "national in its nature," whether uniformity
and equal application of law are desirable or not. If
any test is prescribed by the Cooley Case, it would .appear to 'be that noted above, as to the degree of embhrrassment which can flow from multiple control of a single res.
It is said again-and again that '"the commerce with
foreign nations and between states W h'oh consists in the
transportation of persons and property between them

is a subject of national character and requires uniform-

120

Dickinson Law Review

ity of regulation."'
These are admittedly nmatters in
which current theory ca1s for the utmost variety in the
terms of regulation, so that the use of the word "uniformity" is likely to be misleading. But the commerce which
consists in "transportation of persons and property from
state to state" is a commerce for wfhich no state is likely to be able to furnish a single control, for the simple
reason that the res is not solely within its boundaries.
In such cases the Supreme Court prefers that there
should be a uniform lack of regulation rather than that
there should be conflicting regulations, or the possibility
thereof.
6. BUSINESS WHICH IS NOT COMMERCE
This discussion in its general scope, is concerned
with business which the Supreme Court considers to be
comnerce, and commerce which is deemed interstate,
rather than with a critical examination of the definitions of commerce and interstate commerce which the
courts have adopted. In some instances, however, these
definitions diverge strangely ifrom the commonly accepted and reasonably to be expected meanings of commerce and inter-state commerce and the principles
whnich have been discussed may perhaps throw some
light, if not upon the reason for such divergence, at
least upon the facts w'hich make it possible for such
divergence to exist.
It is frequently !held that the term commerce doeB
not include the contractual relations between citizens
of different states, which are incidental or even essential to interstate commercial intercourse. Justice McLean, in Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 3, said that the
"individual who uses hs money and credit in buying and
7: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, U4 U. S. 196.
8. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169.
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s~Jingils. .of exchange, is not. engaged in tommercei"
That "issfiing a policy of insurance is not comnmere" hag
-been held in a numler of cases.
'he,'above are typical examples. They ring-strangely. The fact is that 'deiling in bills of exchange and
issuing policies of insurance are commonly understood to
be commercial pursuits. The uniform law which codifies the law of. Bills and Notes throughout most of the
country is known as one of the Uniform, Commercial
Acts., InsurAnce poltcies are called "mere incidents of
commerce." This does not explain why the incidents of
conmnerce should not be within the grasp of a power to
regulate commerce.
he instrumentalities of commerce
are subject to the power of Congress; why not the incidents? The insurance of a life, or of a house, is perhaps not so clearly commerce as the insurance of a
marine cargo, but even in the former cases there is contemplated the transnm:ssion of a policy and money. a
transmission. wbh is quite frequently from one state
to another. The broker who deals in foreign biss of
exchange was said not to be engaged in commerce,
but in "supplying the instrumentalities of commerce:'
Why should the business of supplying the instrumentalities of commerte be beyond the reach of a power to
regulate commerce?
If the right to ship in interstate
commerce carries with it the right to solicit contracts
for the sale of goods in other states, why are not th.
contracts themselves, within the purview and protectier
of the conimerce clause? Issuing a policy of insurance
,isnot a transaction of commerce, because the policy
is a "simple contract," said the court in Paul v. Virglum,
supra, and a "contract is not an article of commerce in
9.

Paul v. Virginia, 8 WaRl 168; Hooper v.

Wjlifo uia, 165 U.

S. 647; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens 178 U. S. 389. N Y Life
Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County 231 U. S. 495.
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any proper sense of the word." -This may be granted,
but the contract may nevertheless bear so intimate a
relation to cominerce as to call for an explanation of its
not being a proper subject for regulation under a power
to regulate commerce.
CertWhily no violence would have been, done to the
.meaning of the word commerce if it had been held that
it included the transactions named and described above.
And it will not be contended that the contractual relations between citizens of different states are so remotely
related, so completely incidental to interstate comnierce,
that unlimited control over them by states could not
burden and hamper interstate commerce even as interstate commerce is defined by the Suprenie Court. Commerce among the states would undoubtedly suffer if
states could impose burdensone restrictions upon the
making of contracts between .persons of diverse citizenship, or could deny remedies on such contracts; or if
insurance business were made unprofitable by state
restraint; or if for&gn- bills of exchange were taxed
heavily and dealing in them nlade difficult. Commerce
among the states would suffer if, with regard to any of
these transactions, states should give preferences to
their own citizens, as against the 4etizens of other states
Whatever may have been the Supreme Court's reasons for not including such transactions in itis'definitions
of commerce and interstate commerce, the reasons for
invoking the commerce elause to control them vhile
Congress is silent are not compelling. This is true because the damage that might be dome to interstate
commerce by state regulation is in most instances effectuaily checked by clauses of the Constitution other than
the commerce clause. Federal control prevents the impairment of the obligation of contracts, and in general
ensures reasonable regulation by guaranteeing that .property will not be taken without due process and equal
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protection of law. A state is forbidden to discriminate against citzens of other states by the clause
which gives to citizens of each state the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several states. The
state's power is further limited by the fact that citizens
of d,'fferent states need not submit their causes to state
tribunals at all, since federal courts are given jurisdiction over such controversies.
The principles which apply to state regulation of
things *hich move from place to place, so as to have
physical Eitus in more than one state, have been noted.
A contract, or agreement, however, is intangible, and
jurisprudence has little difficulty in assigning a single
state as its situs for a particular purpose, notwithstanding the fact that the parties to the agreement may be
citizens of different states, with perhaps a subject
matter in a third state, and performance contemplated
in a fourth. Whatever legal question arises under the
agreement, the law of a particular state is said to be
-applicable. It may be that the law of conflicts of the
State of A requires that it enforce the substantive law
of the State of B in ihe particular case, but in any
event, the law of but a single state is applicable. It is
thought that no difficuy arises in such case from
the fact that B's law operates extraterritorially, since it
is not B, but A that is enforcing The law, and the scruples
of the judiciary against permitting laws to operate extraterritorially are limited to laws imposing taxes and
laws of a penal nature.
The intricacies of the law of conflicts cannot be
g'ne "nto minutely here, but enough h0s been said to
show, that as a geneial proposition, agreements though
between citizens of different states, and incidental and
essential to interstate comnerce, are not subject to the
difficulties peculiar to tangible things which move from
state to state. When it has been decided that the law of
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a particular forum is applicable to the agreement on the
point in issue, the situs of ihe agreement for that purpose has been fixed within a single state, and but one
law is applicable. The limitations upon the power of
the states previously referred to should then be adequate
to prevent that one law from being unduly burdensome
or discrininatory, even if recourse to the courts of a
state were necessary, as it is not. If thqn, there is no
peculiar need to invoke the commerce clause for the purpose of preventing the burdening of commerce, it is a
matter of small concern whether or not the subject is
called commerce. If contractual relations of citizens of
different states, incidental and essential to interstate
commerce, could be protected only by the commerce
clause, no doubt it would long since have been held that
these transactions were commerce, and interstate commerce.
There is a glaring exception to the proposition that,.
whether or not a business, such as, for example, insurance, is within the Supreme Court's definition of
commerce, parts of the Constitution other than the commerce clause prevent the burdening of such business by
states. Paul v. Virginia, supra, and a number of subsequent cases" have stood for the doctrine that the right
of a foreign corporation to do business in a state other
than that of its creation depends wholly upon the will
of such other state. The basis of the doctrine is that
the corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of
the clause of the Constitution guaranteeing the citizens
of each stae the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the several states. It is conceded that, if the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce, the rule does
not apply. Thus, in Hooper v. Californ'a, 155 U. S., at
page 652, the Supreme Court says: "Whilst there are
10. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63.
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exceptions to this rule, they embrace only cases where
a corporation created by one state .rests its right to
enter another and engage in business there upon the
Federal nature of its business." A holding that the business transacted by a foreign corporation is not commerce is therefore vital.
Signs are not wanting of a repentance of the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia and its successors. The court
has tied its hands so far as granting to foreign corporation the privileges and immun'ties of citizens of
the several states is concerned, but the fourteenth
amendment has given some ground for a change of
front on the question. Southern Railway Company -.
Green, 216 U. S. 400, holds that a corporation is a
person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and that, whatever power a state may have to exclude or determine the terms of admiission of foreign
corpora'ons not already within its limits, it must grant
Them equal protection of the laws after they have come
into the state in compliance with its laws.
Not only is the tendency to overrule Paul v. Virginia
on the degree of control which states may exercise over
foreign corporations doing business within the'r limits,
but there is apparently a growing conviction that contractual relations incidental and essential to interstate
comimerce should come within the definition of interstate commerce. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company v. United States, 237 U. S. 19, is significant in this connection. The Insurance Conrpany, a
corporation engaged in the business of underwriting
marine insurance, sought to recover taxes paid under
the War Revenue Act of 1898, upon the ground that the
tax was invalid as being in substance a tax upon exports and -hence contrary to Section 8 of Article 1 of
the Federal Constitution, prohibiting any tax or duty
,ipon articles exp(5rbed from any state.
Jusbice
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Hughes says: "Nor have we to do in the present case,
with the taxation of the insurance business as such, or
with the power of the state to fix the conditions upon
which foreign corporations mnay transact business within its borders ............
Let it be assumed, as this court has
said, that the insurance business, generically considered,
is not commerce; that the contract of insurance is a
personal contract,-an inderniity against the happening
of a contingent event. The inquiry still remains vihether policies of insurance against mar. ne risks during the
voyage to foreign ports are not so vitally connected
with exporting that the tax on such policies is essentially a tax upon the exportation itself ............
It cannot be
doubted that insurance during the voyage is by virtue
of the denands of coninerce an integral part df the exportation. The business of the worl is conducted on this
basis." It was held that in this case the tax had been
levied unconstitutionally. The zase should furnish the
lever for controlling state power over contractual relations which bear a necessary relation to interstate com,merce.
In New York Life Insurance Conpany v. Deer
Lodge County, 231 U. S., at page 502, there is a hint that
the court would 'probably decide Paul. v. Virginia differently if it were then -under consideration for the first
time. After citing that case and a nmniber of others following it, the court continues:
"If we consider these
cases numerically, and the deliberation of their reason,ng, and the time they cover, they constitute a formidable body of authority and strongly invoke the sanction
of the rule of stare decisis. This we especially emphasize, for all the cases concerned, as the case at bar
does, the validity of state legislation, and under varying
circumstances the same principle is applied in all of
them. For over forty-five years they have been the
legal justification for such legislation. To reverse the
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cases, thereifore, would require us to promulgate a new
rule of constitutional inhibition upon the state, which
would compel a change of their policy and a readjustment of their laws. Such a result necessarily argue*
against a change of decision."
Paul v. Virginia gave to the state a power to burden business not regarded as interstate commerce by
the Supreme Court. Especially since the tendency
seems to be toward an overruling or modification of the
doctrine of Paul v. Virginia, it seems a reasonabay safe
statement that, so far as the administrat'on of the
commerce clause during the silence of Congress is concefned, it is not a matter of great concern wihetiher or
not the types of business which have been discussed in
this section come within the protection of the commerce
clause as being comnmerce and interstate commerce,
since, as a general rule, other protection is not wanting. It is apparent, however, that the decisions presently under discussion threw a tremendous obstacle in the
way of unifornity of commercial law throughiout the
country. The easiest method of securing such uniformity is through congressional legislation, but congressional legislation is forestalled by decisions that dealing in
bills and notes is not commerce, and that contractual
relations between citizens of different states, incidental
and essential to interstate commerce, are not interstate
commerce. The demand for uniformity, however, has
been so pressing that unifornity is being realized
through other channels, though by slow and somewhat
painful means. The first of these channels is the precedent set by the federal courts for refusing to enforce
state commercial law which is found to be badly out of
agnment with what is called "general confnercial
law.""i The conception of a commercial law of a
11. Swift v. Tysm. 16 Peters 1.
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state other than that which the state itself enforces, has been justly criticised as im'volving severe
fallacy, but in so far as the decisions promote uniformity
of commercial law among the states, the result must
probably be considered desirable. The second channel
through Which uniformity of commercial law is being
realized is the extra-constitutional channel of adoption
of Uniform Commercial Acts by the several states.
Certain comparatively recent legislation by Congress may be noted in connection with the present topic. Congress has enacted the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act to be applicable to interstate shipments," Through
this act, and the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate
Comnmerce Act,-now the Cummins Amendment,"--the
contract entered into by the shipper of an interstate
shipment with the carrier has been brought entirely
within federal control. Such, legislation presupposes
that the contract Df shipment is so vitally related to
the carriage as to be necessarily w'thin the definition of
interstate commerce. This is true even though the
parties to the contract are not citizens of different
states. It is very probable that the constitutionality of
this legislation could not be successfully disiputed, and
it therefore appears that Congress under its commerce
power has regulated that vhioh the courts have declared not to be commerce when they have administered
the law of the commerce clause during the silence of
Congress.
7.

STATE POLICE POWER

A frequent reason assigned for sustaining the validity of state laws affecting interstate comnerce is that
12. Act of August 29, 1916, 39 iStat. 538.
13. Act of Ma-rch 4, 1915 38 Stat. 1196, Chap. 176, and Act
of August 9, 1916, 39 Stat. 441, Chap. 301.
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the legislation is an exercise of the state's police power. In N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R. Co. v, New York,
supra, it was said of the law requiring the heating of
passenger cars: "So far as it may affect interstate
commerce, it is to be regarded as legislation in aid of
commerce and enacted under the power remaining with
the State to regulate the relative rights and duties of
all persons and corporations within its limits."
In
Pittsburg &c Coal Company v. Bates, 156 U. S. 588, the
following is quoted: "It seems hardly necessary to argue
at length that, unless the statute can be justified as a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, it
is an usurpation of the powet vested exclusively in Congress."
Expressions like the foregoing might be multiplied
indefinitely. The implication which arises from them
is that if leg~slation by a state may be called an exercise of police power there is some sort of presumption
in favor of its validity. The further necessry implication is that the federal commerce power can be segregated and kept distinct from the so called police power
of the states. Th's separation is demanded by a fundamental dogma of the constitutional law--the theory of
dual sovereignties. The interstate commerce power,
among other attributes of sovereignty, was delegated
by the states to the general government. The police
power, so runs the theory-was part of the residuum, a
sovereign power no part of wfhich was surrendered to
the general government.
Police power is usually defined as the power to
provide for the health, safety, morals, and welfare of
the members of the body politc. Presumably all legislaVton has this purpose. As was said in The License
Cases, 5 How. 504: "The police powers are nothing
more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty." Such a conception of police power
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does not bode well for any effort to distinguish the police power from any other power of a sovereign government-the power to regulate commerce for example-and an attempt to differentiate the cases in which state
legislation has been dealt with by classifying some of
the regulations as police and others not, could hardly be
expected to prove successful. It would startle no one if
the court had referred to the law under consideration in
Hall v. DeCuir as a police regulation. A regulation
specifying the number of cars to be run on an electric
railway, and the number of passengers which should be
permitted to ride on each car,"' could certainly be aptly
called a police regulation. The power to control rates to
be charged by public utilties is frequently referred to
as a police power. On the other hand, the power of
Congress to regulate comnierce has been held adequate
to prohibit interstate traffic in lottery tickets, misbranded foods and drugs, etc. It would not be easy to
explain why this is not an exercise of police power.
It would seem that no distinction could be successfully based upon a difference between federal oomnierce
power and state police power, for the reason that it Ps
not possible to define -the commerce power so as to differentiate it from the commonly accepted definitions ot
police power. If the fact that a regulation is an exercise of police power puts it within the rights of a state,
it is difficult to see how any state legislation could be
annulled because of conflict with federal commerce
power. Conversely, it would appear futile to attempt
to justify the sustaining of state regulations affecting
interstate commerce by declarations that the regulations
are in exercise of state poliee power. As was said in
Henderson v. The Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259,
"nothing is gained by calling it -the police power.'
14. South Covington Ry. Co. vs. Covington, 235 U. S. 537.
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If the states have sovereign police powers, and the
federal government sovereign commerce power, and commerce power cannot be distinguished from police power
conflicts between state and federal power are inevitable.
Although the courts have rather persistently adhered
to the theory of dual sovereignties, each supreme in its
own sphere, and have constantly spoken of the "powers
reserved to the states," and "the acknowledged powers
of the state,"' they have at the same time realized
that an irrepressible conflict exists, and have not hesitated to declare that, vhere the state and federal power
collide, the latter must prevail and the former succumb.
Chief Justice Mdrshal met
this issue
squarely in Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1.
"Should
this collision exist," he said, "it will be immaterial
whether those laws" were passed in virtue of a
concurrent power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states, or in virtue of a power to regulate their own domestic trade and
police. n one case and the other, the Acts of New York
must yield to the law of Congress."
In N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R. Co. v. New York
supra, with reference to the difficulty that wo.ild be involved In using cars heated in a different manner upon
crossing state boundaries, the court said: "These possible inconveniences cannot affect the question of power
in each state to make such ressonable regulations for the
safety of passengers on interstate trains; as, in its judgment, all things considered, is appropriate and effective.
Inconveniences of this character cannot be avoided so
long as each state has plenary authority within its territorial limits, to provide for the safety of the public
according to its own views of necessity and public pol15. Smith v. Alabamra 124 U. S. 465.
16. Of the State of Now Yo*
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icy, and so lorg as Congress deems it wise not to establish regulations on the subject that would displace any
inconsistent regulations of the states covering the same
ground." If a state has "plenary authority within its
territorial limits to provide for the safety of the public
according to its own views of necessity and public policy," its exercise of authority could not be displaced by
legislation ol Congress. An authority which exists by
the sufferance of Congress would not seem to be plenary.
State police power yields, then, to an actual exercise of commerce power by Congress. Its fate is much
the same wfhen in conflict with what the court assumes
to be the will of Congress during the silence of that body.
The number of cases in xvhich, statutes held valid are
called an exercise of police power is no criterion for
judging the potentiality of such power.
Where no
reason occurs to the court for the invalidation of the
state law, it is a matter of indifference what the law is
called, and it is quite likely to be called a police regulation.
Where the court desires to annul a state law
such result is accomplished by the simple expedient of
:staling that the law is a regulation of interstate commerce, in conflict with the presumed will of Congress
that commerce in -such case is to be free from regulation.
Probably in N.Y.,N.H. and H. R. R. Co. v, New York the
regulaton was sustained, not because it was a police regulation, but it was called a -police regulation because
there appeared no reason for overruling it. In Hall v. DeCuir, calling the regulation'one of lpolice--as -!t certainly
could have been called with reason and propriety-would
have involved serious difficulty in the light of the theory
of dual sovereignties, but all einbarassment was avoided by terming the law a regulation of commerce.
In spite of the theory of dual sovereignties the Supreme Court makes no serious professions at upholding
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state police power as opposed to federal commerce power. This is in l'ne with its doctrine that a state cannot
determine for itself as against the generally accepted
opinion of the nation and tihe comimercial world what are
and what are not legitimate articles of commerce. The
professions of the Supren-e Court, however, are to be
sharply distinguished from the results w hich flow from
the Supreme Court's doctrine. It was said above that the
freedom to traffic in articles judged legitimate by the
Supreme Court is to some extent illusory. The Supreme
Court, While holding to the theory of dual sovereignties
in one breath, and deciding enighpatically in another
that wNhere there is conflict the federal power must
prevail, does, as a matter of fact, permit the state police power to prevail to a certain extent over the federal
commerce power. The fact is exemplified by the results
arrived at under The orignal patkage doctrine, an aborlive attempt to give freedom to interstate commerce
without infringing upon the police and taxing powers
of the states.
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MOOT COURT
McDONA.LD v. PENMAN
Set off-Wagers on Elections--Act of March 24, 1817, 2 Stewart
Purdon 1332.
STATEMBENT OF PACGS
This is a suit on a note for $500.00 made by Penman. Penman seeks to set off a claim for $500. 'He and McDonald had
made a bet on the Presidential election and Penman having lost
paid $500 to McDonald. The Court allowed the set off.
De Renzo for the plaintiff.
C orson, J., for the defendant.
OPINION OP THE OOURT
JENKINS, J.
The question in this case is whether
the lower Court erred in allowing the set off as claimed where the party claiming the set off was a participant
in
the
fraud.
By
an
Act
of
Assembly
passed March 24, 1917, 2 Selwart Pard. 133,
"wagering or
betting on the event of an election, held under the constitution
or laws of the United States, of this Commonwealth is hereby prohibited, and all contracts or promises founded thereon
are declared to be entirely null and void." 'lhe only authentic
and adfissible evidence of public policy, of a State on any
given subject is its constitution, laws and judicial decisions. And
the public policy of a State of which Courts take notice and to
which they give effect must be decided from those sources,
whdere the State has spoken, through its legislature, there is no
room for speculation, as to what the policy of the State is.
In Pittsburg v. Goshorn, 230 Pa., 212, the Court -held "that
a contract against public policy as distinguished from one mere.
ly ultra vires is absolutely without any force or effect whatever, so that it cannot under any circumntances be made the
basis of an action. The law when appealed to will have nothing
to do wiih it, but will leave the parties just in the condition in
which tt finds them. If the contract is executed, the law leaves
the parties in possession of vhat each has acquired under it;
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if executory, it refuses to enforce it." If then this contract defend* against public policy, as it unquestionably does, the legal
results which follow are far more serious than those which Ittach to a contract simply ultra vires. The latter is illegal only
in a sense that it lacks authority for the making; the infirmity
is remediable; it may be cured by subsequent ratification, and
iseven enforceable against the party who has received the bensfits under it, and afterwards, seeks to repudiate it. What results to a contract against public Volicy is a total and irremediable paralysis which leaves it absolutely without any force or
effect 'ihatever, so that it cannot under any circumstances, be
made the basis of a cause of action.
In Kreusler v. Mciees Rooks School District 256 Pa. 281,
in which the defendant claimed the riglht to, set off a sum which
dke Ilad paid to plaintiff on an illegal contract, ifhe Court properly refused to allow this iset off as the amount claimed was
paid under the legal contract. The case of Speise v. MfcCoy 8
W. and S. 485 'sauthority for the proposition that money voluntarily paid in discharge of a void obligation cannot be recovered back.
Judge Yeates in Mitshell v. Smith 1 Binney 121, lays down
the doctrine that every contract made for or about any matter
or thing, which is prohibited and made unlatwful by any statute
is a void contract, though the State itself does not mention that
it shall be so, but inflicts a penalty on the offender; because the
-penalty iMrOies a prohibition, though there are no prohibitory
words in the statute. It cannot be dened, that contracts which
violates the rules of decency or morality or oppose principles
of sound policy of the country are illegal and void. So, also, sof
contracts. which immediately tend to defeat the legislative provisions for the securitm and peace of the community, though
not made void by statutes.
Oonsidering that the great we-gibt of authority on the
point of law involved in this case is exemplified in the cases
which we have cted, the decision of the louwer Court is reversed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
A set off is a suit "to be regarded," says Sharswood,J.,"in
all respects as if it was a separate action by the defendant as
against tlhe plaintiff." Everson v. Fry, 72 Pa. 326. The question before us then. is, virtually, could Penman, having paid the
bet, by suit recover it back?
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[Betting on elections is made illegal, not only by the Court, as
wagering, but by statute, 2 Stewart's Purd. 1332. This statute
declares the contract of 'betting "to be entirely null and void."
The winner could not compel perfornmance by the Ibser of his
contract.
But, if thle contract has been performed by the loser, it
is not so far void as to make illegitimnate, the winner's retention
of the prize. The principle applicable is explained by Stewart,
J. Pittsburg v. Goshorn, 230 Pa. 212, "If they (the parties ta
the illegal contract) have fully executed their unlawful contract, the law will not disturb them in the possession of w~hat
each has acquired under it, x x x if the contract has been executed the promisee is left undisturbed in the possession of the
money or other property whicn has been paid or conveyed to
him." The principle is applied to wagers on elections by Gibson C. J., "By permitting the mcney to pam -into the hands of
the winner, the loser voluntarily paid a debt, which though void
as to its legat obligation, has tVie effect of 'preventing a recovery back."' Spekse v. ITcCoy, 6 W. and S. 485. McAllister v.
Hoffman 16 S. and R. 147. ,Had the money not been paid by
the loser, it could not be extorted from him by an action. Had
it been in the hands of a stakoholder payment of it by him
could have been forbidden by tbe loser, and he could have recovered it, either from the staketholder or from the winner, had
the latter received it.
As there was no right to recover the money which Penman
'bad voluntarily paid on performance of the 'bet, to McDonald,
a suit for it, or a set off is ineffectual.
Judgment affirmed.
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BOOK 1(LVILW
Constitutional Power and World Affairs, by George Sutiherland, former Senator of the United States from Utah. The Colunifbia University Press, N. Y., 1919.
This bock contains the Bumenthal Foundation Lectures delivered at the Columbia University in Dec. 1918. Of tihe style
of these lectures too much in praise cannot be said. They are
terse and clear and suffused with a stately eloquence. Few patriotic men will dissent from the orator's conceptions of tihe
wa.
Germany deserves all the condeimnation which he voices.
His chief constitutional aim seems to be to broaden the treaty
power of the United States, and in lessening the influence of
the Senate over treaties to magnify that of tfhe Executive. In
his effort to widen the treaty-power -he lays down the doctrine
t1hat the states never were severally independent; that they
never had any power to enter into diplomatic and treaty relations with other political groups; that, in creating the present
Union; therefore, they did not ;bestow on it its power -ver
treaties because they had none to give. In a review it is impossible to enter largely into a discussion of this theory, from
wXich we must wholly dissent. The coonies had a conmon relation to the mother state, but no relation to each other. Each
of them, in the inchoate stage of the Revolution, assumed the
power of treaty making, and on virtue of this assumption, created the Continental Congress. That was the product of e, treaty
making plower assumed aUd hoc.
When the Constitution was
formed, it went into operation by the separate and independent
agreement of each state, with its sister states, another exercise
of the treaty power. The new Union began with Rhode Island,
and North Carolina dctached and independent republics. It is
idle to say, that as such they haa no d:plonratic or treaty making power. When they entered the Union, it wtvs on virtue of
an agreement between that Union, now. a nation, and themselves as free communities. The fact that they had made no attempt to procure recognition from European States results simply from the fact that they were deliberating upon a speedy entrance into the Union, and not from the want of power, as independent states. Later is the case of Texas, wlhich was an independent republic, and wihich actuaiy made a treaty with the
United States for its incorporation into the American Union, a
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treaty which lailed to obtain the assent of the necessary number
of senators. It strikes us as odd %hata man of ability should,
in order to maintain a wide treaty-making power assert that
(that power did not come from the states because they never
had it.)
The attempt to connect the two Unions together, that under the Confederatim and that under the Constitution, is also
in defiance of history. The transitory co-operation of the thirteen states, was followed in 1781 by a Union under the Articles
of CJonfederation. In six years, that became unsatisfactory. A
new Union was proposed, to supersede the Articles as soon as
nine states agreed to it. On the agreement by the ninth state
bhe Co.federation *was dissolved, and the four states which had
Pot agreed to "ratify" became detached and independent states
if nr.t -io before. They retained the option to enter the new
Union or not.
In all this we see the exercise of a power in
each to determine its relation to the others; surely a diplomatic,
a treaty-making pwer.
Phrases like "Nationality was inherent from the beginning"
are idle. From the beginning vf whfat? I7herent in what?
1hut the colonies as _eCparate political corpjrbtior. agree,1 t,
speak unitedly in a Congress of delegates surely did not force
them into one nationality. As well say that the treaty between
the States and Fra~ce to wage jointly war against Great Britain, and not to make a separate -peace, made a Franco-Ainerican
nationality "inherent from the beginning." Since the states
freely entered the Union, and thus created the nation-state, it
is strange that any thinker of consequence, asseits that some of
the powers which this creature possesses were self-created, or
conferred directly by Jupiter. We close by commending the book
(of 200 pages) to the perusal of aill that are interested in great
Constitutional questions.
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